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a manufacturer who simply refuses to deal with a retailer selling below a
minimum price does not act illegally." As Parke, Davis points out, it is only
when the manufacturer applies coercion above and beyond the simple refusal
to deal that illegality arises. However, it should be noted that courts have
not been at a loss to find the necessary coercion. 17 In view of this and the
holding in the present case, it would appear that if , there is any element of
coercion used to enforce prices fixed by a consignment agreement, the courts
will find a violation of the Sherman Act.
It is difficult, however, to conceive of a consignment agreement covering
many retailers in which a court could not detect coercive measures. Indeed,
even if a legal, non-coercive agreement could be drafted, it would invite
expensive litigation. Therefore, it would seem that gasoline suppliers will in
the future have to depend upon competition to maintain steady prices or
else operate their own stations with their own employees. The latter solution
appears to be preferrable in light of United States v. Standard Oil Co." where
the government noted that gasoline companies have the right to operate their
own stations and to sell in them any products they manufacture or distribute.
DWIGHT W. MILLER
Corporations—Fiduciary Duty of Director of Full and Frank Dis-
closure in Adversary Proceedings.—Alleghany v. Kirby.'—In December,
1949, Kirby, president of the Alleghany Corporation, and three other officers
and directors voted to exchange their personally held shares of Alleghany
preferred stock for Alleghany's holdings of Investment Diversified Services,
Inc. (IDS). Kirby transferred his Alleghany stock to Alleghany for 24,062
shares of IDS priced at slightly over $8. In 1954 the IDS stock had risen to
$200 per share and Kirby had profited by more than $4,500,000. Several suits
were brought against Kirby and others in state and federal courts in 1954-
1955 by stockholders of Alleghany. Ten of these suits were consolidated under
the title, Zenn v. Anzalone. 2 The consolidated complaint alleged a conspiracy
by Kirby and others to enrich themselves at the expense of Alleghany and
fraudulently to induce the stockholders to ratify such acts by misrepresent-
ing the financial picture of IDS in proxy statements used at the stock-
holders' meeting of May 3, 1950. The focal point of the Zenn suit was
the IDS stock deal and the inside knowledge of the defendants concerning
the enormous prospective increase in earnings of IDS.
A settlement stipulation was drafted in July, 1955. After notice was given
to all stockholders, a referee began a hearing on the merits of the fairness
and adequacy of the settlement, which was, in effect, a hearing on the merits
18 Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
17 See 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 687 supra note 8 for some conditions relied on
by the courts to find this element of coercion.
18 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
1 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 17 Misc.2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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of the suits. Kirby was never served process to appear at the hearing. After
protracted negotiations, the defendants' offer of $3,000,000 cash and return
of control of IDS to Alleghany was accepted and judgement upon the settle-
ment was ordered by the Supreme Court, N.Y.C. in December, 1959.
The appellant-stockholder in the noted case, seeking to overturn the
judgment on the Zenn settlement, introduced before the district court docu-
ments which were not in evidence in the Zenn hearings. These documents,
found subsequent to the settlement, were allegedly withheld by Kirby from
the referee in Zenn. The appellant claims that Kirby was under an affirma-
tive duty to disclose such facts and that his nondisclosure constitutes fraud
sufficient to warrant vacation of the judgment on the Zenn settlement.
The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that Kirby committed
a fraud upon the state court or its referee in failing to produce documents
which were not called for at the hearings and most of which were not in
his possession but rather in the possession of IDS . 3 Appeal was taken to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. HELD: A director's fiduciary duty
of disclosure of material facts to the stockholder ceases when action is
brought against him by the stockholders. A director becomes an ordinary
adversary with no greater obligation of disclosure than that required by
court process.4
The court reasoned that because derivative suits are based upon the
belief that wrongdoing directors will not confess their wrongful acts, they
cannot be considered fiduciaries once suit is commenced against them.
The stockholders no longer consider them fiduciaries in relation to the subject
matter of the suit, and therefore the directors have every right to defend
themselves as ordinary adversaries. The court further reasoned that the
plaintiffs representing the interests of the firm had sufficient opportunity
to press the suit against the director. In addition, if the appellant's theory
were accepted, the finality of suits would be seriously threatened, because
in a trust or fiduciary situation any newly discovered evidence which a
director did not bring forward and which might have changed the result
would be enough to overturn a judgment.
The dissent maintained that it could perceive no principle which would
lessen the director's duty because of a derivative suit. The director's obliga-
tion of full and frank disclosure to disinterested co-directors and stockholders
should continue even in the adversary situation of a stockholder's action
against the director. This is particularly true when the director remains in
control of the corporation, its officers and its relevant files. The director is,
in effect, in control of the outcome of the suit. The director should not have
to search out information against himself, but should be under a duty to bring
before the court material facts within his own knowledge.
There is a practical need for extending the present fiduciary duties of a
director to the area of an adversary situation, and there is also a legal basis
3 Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
4 The court also held that "nondisclosed" evidence must be such as would require
a new trial in order to support a collateral attack on a state court judgment. Cumula-
tive evidence of fraud giving rise to the original suit is not enough.
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for the extension in the trend toward rising standards of director Ioyalty 8
in analogous areas. These shall be discussed in turn below. This extension of
a director's duty would produce one basic change. Under present case law,
when any transaction by a director is challenged by the corporation and
stockholders on the grounds of self-dealing, the director is under the burden
"not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein." 8
 If a director is subjected to the new duty of full and frank dis-
closure of material facts during a suit against him, he would be required
to bring forth evidence proving not only the fairness of his action, but also
its unfairness, if any existed. Under this new duty nondisclosure would,
upon discovery by a plaintiff-stockholder, be grounds for setting aside any
judgment obtained by a director, because his action would constitute a breach
of trust.
Because there is no direct authority supporting the theory of extending
a director's fiduciary duty of full and frank disclosure to an adversary
situation, it is necessary to draw support from analogous areas in which the
trend is to increase the standard of loyalty expected of a director. In one
instance, because of "flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by direc-
tors and officers . . ."7 with regard to the use of confidential informa-
tion gained in their fiduciary capacity, Congress enacted Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8 Under section 16, a director's opportunity
to profit by his inside knowledge of the corporation's activities is severely
restricted. Before 1934 a director was relatively free to trade in company
securities, and most courts found no duty running from a director to the'
stockholder under the circumstances of a wholly personal transaction .° There
was, however, some authority for the proposition that a director might owe
a fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder. 1° This duty was based upon
the director's superior position with regard to inside knowledge of the
corporation's activities, and cases upholding such a duty required disclosure
by the director to the stockholder of material facts bearing on the value of
the securities. Under section 16 a director is now required to report to the
Securities Exchange Commission all securities he owns in the registered
corporation" and to return to the corporation all "short swing" profits made
on the purchase and sale of company securities within any six month period.'2
The arbitrary strictness of the act is shown by the fact that no actual use
of inside information or intention to get out on a "short swing" is required
5
 See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (ED, Wis. 1962); Brophy v.
Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
6
 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
7 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934)-
8 SeCurities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958).
9 See, e.g., Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 407, 169 N.E. 268, 271 (1929).
10 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1958).
12
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1958).
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in order to give rise to liability under section 16." The duty of a director to
disclose all material facts to the court during a derivative suit, if adopted,
would parallel section 16 in two major respects. First, the corporation and
stockholders would be protected from the director's ability to profit by inside
information and the standard of disclosure would be strict. Second,-the duty
of disclosure, like the requirement of return of profits under section 16, would
apply regardless of a director's intent; for a breach of the new duty would
not be judged by a director's mental state concerning the nondisclosure, but
by the materiality of the facts not brought before the court during litigation.
Another supporting analogy may be drawn from the area of stockholder
ratification, in which disclosure of inside knowledge of a director is again
of major importance. A director has a duty to disclose all improper trans-
actions and material facts concerning his own actions or ratification by stock-
holders will not be upheld by a court of law. 14 A director might otherwise
be able to camouflage improper transactions under a blanket approval by
stockholders without the benefit of specific information concerning the trans-
actions they are called upon to ratify. To require full and frank disclosure by
a director in regard to stockholder ratification and then to allow him to
obtain a court judgement for the breach of such a duty without the same
requirement of full and frank disclosure seems inconsistent and does not
provide the stockholder and corporation with adequate means of protecting
their interests. A director will not be deterred from making fraudulent proxy
statements or taking other illegal actions so long as he knows that once in
court he will be relieved of the duty of disclosing any material facts that
the plaintiff shareholders have not been able to uncover. By requiring a
director to observe the standard of full and frank disclosure throughout
court proceedings, the chances of retaining profits fraudulently acquired
would be reduced; and directors in some instances could conceivably be
deterred from fraudulent practices in the first place, with a resultant decline
in derivative suits by stockholders. Granting that the finality of judgments
on suits, or settlements would be threatened by the adoption of the new
duty, the overall effect might be a net decline in litigation.
A third analogous area is that of corporate opportunity, in which the
courts have recently begun to consider a director's role from an even more
dejnanding point of view. There is developing in this area an advanced
notion of affirmative duties in that a director ". , . cannot use his power for
his personal advantage . . . no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements"" of his office. Early cases imposed constructive trusts
on profits and property which directors gained by taking personal advantage
of opportunities, such as options, which were available to the corporation and
in which the corporation had some existent right." If the corporation had
no present interest in an opportunity coming to the attention of a director,
he was under no legal obligation to tender it to the corporation. In the later
la Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961).
14
 Atlas Coal Co. v. Jones, 245 Iowa .506, 61 N.W.2d 663 (1953).
15 Pepper v. Litton, supra note 6, at 311.
16 Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
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case of Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp.'? defendant directors and officers
of a corporation which manufactured wheel alignment devices set up a
partnership to manufacture a wheel-balancing machine and other equipment
for use in wheel alignment. The court held that tender of the opportunity
of entering this new field to the corporation was demanded despite the cor-
poration's lack of a vested interest in it. The opportunity was considered to
be too closely associated with the existing and prospective activities of the
corporation to be withheld. It has been held that even a corporation's in-
capacity to accept an opportunity does not give the director a right to take
it.18
 The House of Lords has said that if an opportunity to purchase comes
to directors solely by reason of their being directors, they are liable to the
corporation for any profit derived from it'll It is immaterial that the corpora-
tion is unable to make the purchase itself. Justice Cardozo said, "Uncom-
promising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion'
of particular exceptions."20 Considering the foregoing, the exception to a
director's undivided loyalty allowed by the courts during derivative suits
seems unwarranted.
During litigation a trustee is under a duty to disclose all material facts,
or the judgment will be overturned upon proof of nondisclosure. 21 The ap-
pellant, in the noted case, argues that the comparison drawn between a trustee
and a director in pre-litigation activities ought to be carried over into the
area of litigation where the duty of disclosure upon the trustee is strict.22
The appellee argues that the defendant-director appears in a derivative suit
solely in an individual capacity whereas the trustee is acting during any
litigation in his fiduciary capacity." The strength of this argument depends
upon the efficacy of a derivative suit to represent the corporate interests. If
derivative suits adequately represent the corporate interest, there is no neces-
sity for the courts to treat directors as trustees with the correspondingly
stricter standard of disclosure.
The corporate interest, however, is not adequately represented during
derivative suits for many reasons. Most importantly, the average stockholder
who suspects wrongdoing by directors will not be able to obtain detailed
information and proof of the specific wrongs." Despite discovery, the stock-
holder-plaintiff will have difficulty in obtaining information on complex
transactions. The expense of litigation and difficulties in organizing share-
holders for collective action are clearly not outweighed by the prospects of
a successful suit, for all benefits of such a suit accrue to the corporation."
Even when the plaintiff has substantial proof, as in the noted case, the
17 99 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d 558 (1954).
18
 E.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
18 Regal v. Gulliver, [1942) 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.).
20 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
21 Matter of Lautz, 128 Misc. 710, 220 N.Y. Supp. 782 (Surr. Ct. Erie County 1927).
22 Brief for Appellant for Rehearing en Banc, Appendix A, pp. 1-18.
23 Brief for Appellee, pp. 43-52, 65, 66, Alleghany v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir.
1964).
24 See, e.g., Davis v. Cohn, 260 App. Div. 624, 23 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1940).
22 Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
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plaintiff comes under great pressure to settle 2 6 The great consumption of
time in a derivative suit and the prospect of losing all if the case is litigated
on the merits frequently leaves the plaintiff-shareholder with little choice
but to settle. Recovery by corporations in New York court settlements
amounts on the average to three per cent of the amount sued for." The un-
representative nature of derivative suits severely undercuts the theory of the
majority's opinion in the noted case. Because the corporate interest must be
represented, and because the ordinary derivative suit does not fulfill the task,
the burden of sustaining the corporate welfare logically should devolve upon
the director. By requiring the director to observe the standard of full and
frank disclosure during litigation, derivative suits would be made more effec-
tive, because a director's ability to control litigation and to effect an outcome
favorable to himself would be lessened considerably.
In summary, because of the lack of precedent bearing on this issue,
the courts will have to weigh the two contrary viewpoints on the director's
duties during derivative suits. Balanced against the threat to the finality of
judgments is a desirable strengthening of the stockholder's position in
derivative suits. Although imposition of this duty may not produce immediate
compliance by wrongdoing directors, the remedies of stockholders will not
be cut off by an adverse decision. If a director withholds material evidence
of his wrongdoing, it will constitute a breach of duty and provide the stock-
holder with the procedural means of overturning an unjust decision favoring
the wrongdoer. The adoption of this new duty seems clearly in line with the
trend in case law toward a higher standard of loyalty of directors to their
corporation and stockholders.
JOHN A. DONOVAN
Damages—Income Taxes—Compensation Basis for Wrongful Death
Act.—Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S.'—While unloading
cargo, a longshoreman was killed by a falling hatch boom on defendant's
vessel which was moored in New York territorial waters. His administratrix
brought this admiralty action in the United States Court for the Southern
District of New Yorke to recover her damages as the wife-beneficiary under
the New York wrongful death act. 3 Finding defendant's equipment un-
seaworthy, the trial court was required to compute fair and just compensa-
tion for the pecuniary injuries to the wife as a result of the wrongful death.
213 Report of the SEC on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Per-
sonnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, 675-76 (1937), pt. 1.
27 Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse—Present and Future, 41
Colum. L. Rev. 405, 426 (1941).
1 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 Although the longshoreman's widow did not qualify for the admiralty provisions
of the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958),
admiralty in personam remedies which follow New York law were available on account
of death within the territorial waters of that state. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S.
588 (1959); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
3 N,Y. Decedent Estate Law §§ 130-35.
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